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Abstract 
This study illustrates in detail the Hull and White reduced-from model for 
pricing CDS spreads and applied the model to real bond data.  
Following the assumption of the model, that the yield spread between a 
defaultable bond and a default-free bond only captures the probability of 
default, we aim at calculating a number of static CDS spread. To attain the 
CDS spread for different reference entities with time to maturity 1 to 5 years 
on May 15th, 2009, bond prices are carefully collected with special attention to 
time to maturity and coupon payment. And then zero curves for both 
Treasury and corporate bonds are constructed using bootstrapping method 
and interpolation. Finally, theoretical default probabilities and CDS spread 
are calculated with recovery rate exogenously given as constant. 
Our results shows it might be the reason that the model is based on a 
theoretical framework with rather strict assumptions, it is incapable of 
adjusting to situations where factors deviate from the given assumptions, that 
the yield spread only captures credit risk. Therefore the model does not 
perform ideally in practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Yield spread, CDS spread, Credit default swap, Hull and White 
model. 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................1 
2. BACKGROUND ...............................................................................................................................3 
2.1. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS ..............................................................................................................3 
2.2. TERM STRUCTURE .........................................................................................................................7 
2.3. CREDIT PRICING MODELS.............................................................................................................8 
3. THE HULL AND WHITE MODEL .............................................................................................10 
3.1. ESTIMATING DEFAULT PROBABILITIES AT DISCRETE TIMES ......................................................10 
3.2. THE MODEL’S PRECONDITION ....................................................................................................14 
4. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL ...............................................................................................15 
4.1. SIMPLIFIED ASSUMPTIONS...........................................................................................................15 
4.2. DATA ...........................................................................................................................................16 
4.3. VALUATION OF THE CDS SPREAD ..............................................................................................17 
4.3.1. Treasury Zero Curve............................................................................................................20 
4.3.2 Corporate Zero Curve ...........................................................................................................23 
4.3.3. Default Probabilities and CDS spread .................................................................................24 
4.3.4. Theoretical CDS spread and Quoted CDS spread ...............................................................31 
5. ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................................34 
5.1. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS .............................................................................................34 
5.2. ANALYSIS OF PRICING ERROR .....................................................................................................35 
6. CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................38 
REFERENCES......................................................................................................................................39 
APPENDIX 1. COMPANIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY .......................................................41 
APPENDIX 2. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON RECOVERY RATE .............................................42 
APPENDIX 3. GRAPHS ON THEORETICAL AND QUOTED CDS SPREAD .....................43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1  
1. Introduction 
Most financial assets are, in one way or another, subject to credit risk: the 
uncertainty surrounding the counterparty’s ability to meet its financial 
obligations. The three main variables that affect the credit risk of a financial 
asset are: (i) default probability, (ii) loss given default, which equals to one 
minus recovery rate in the event of default, and (iii) the exposure at default. 
Credit risk can be dealt with by transferring the underlying asset or by using 
credit derivatives. Credit default swaps (CDS) are in the most widespread use 
among various credit derivatives. 
Credit risk has become a topical issue in the awake of the recent credit crisis. 
And the massive CDS market has been believed to exacerbate the global 
financial meltdown starting in 2008. “Credit default swaps have played a 
prominent role in the mushrooming credit crisis that in the past month led to 
Lehman filing for bankruptcy protection, a government rescue plan for 
insurer American International Group Inc. and Merrill Lynch & Co. selling 
itself to Bank of America Corp.” (International Business Times, 2009) 
Therefore it is reasonable to question whether credit risk transferring is a 
stabilizing mechanism or more of concentration. As many other financial 
derivatives, CDS can be used as an instrument for hedging, arbitraging and 
speculating. Speculating and arbitraging exist only when investors think the 
CDS spread is higher or lower than its fair price therefore the importance of 
accurate pricing must be drawn to prevent the massive use of CDS, which 
exacerbate the financial crisis. This is quite a big issue to discuss with different 
perspectives and dimensions. However, we believe that if the CDS spreads 
are correctly priced then no arbitrage opportunities can be found in the 
market as a whole, CDS can be served mainly as a good instrument to transfer 
credit risk. Hence we think pricing factors and pricing techniques are vital in 
credit derivatives, in particular the CDS market. 
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Combining our interests in the extensive credit world together with our 
academic background, what we think is a doable project for this thesis is to 
look deeply into a particular credit model, which can be used to price CDS 
spread. We choose the no-arbitrage reduced-form model proposed by Hull 
and White (2000). Our goal is to apply the Hull and White model to real bond 
data with some simplified assumptions and calculate the corresponding CDS 
spread. By comparing the theoretical CDS spread with the CDS spread quoted 
on the market, we can criticize on how well the model works, which 
assumptions in the modeling framework should be released and if there 
might be any additional pricing factors which are omitted in the original 
modeling framework. By concluding we hope we will be able to give some 
suggestions on better projections of the credit risk modeling process and a 
more accurate pricing technique of the CDS spread. 
The main objective in this paper is to explain and illustrate how Hull-White 
has constructed and developed a model for the pricing of CDS spread and to 
apply the model to real bond data on the market. Furthermore we will 
compare the CDS spread calculated using Hull and White model with the 
quoted spread from the market. The questions we will try to address are 
hence how effective the Hull-White model is when it is applied on real data 
and if there is a possibility to substitute bits and pieces originally used in the 
equation for more accurate results. Due to the restrictions in time we limit our 
research to cover only the very first of Hull and White paper where the 
modeling is done in discrete time framework. Although we urge the 
interested readers to cover all of the articles covered to a more extensive 
modeling technique. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
and empirical background in this field, with an in-depth introduction on CDS 
and two main classes of credit pricing models. Section 3 presents the Hull and 
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White reduced-form model. Section 4 provides how we apply the model in 
this paper and the theoretical results. The analysis of pricing errors and 
interpretation of our empirical results are provided in Section 5 and Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Background 
  2.1. Credit Default Swaps 
This section is mainly in place to give the reader a broader understanding 
around how this derivative is constructed and to what purpose it has for the 
buyer vis-à-vis seller. Since this paper is written around this specific 
derivative it is important to give a thorough description of it before we go any 
further. In order to simplify for the readers we have chosen to use the same 
terminology as Hull and White when it comes to describing credit derivatives 
and the CDS in particular. 
O´Kane and Turnbull (2003) described the CDS and gave an explanation for 
the rapid growth of this specific derivative. The reason was and still is the 
unique possibility for agents to hedge or speculate in the credit worthiness of 
a company without taking an opposite position.  
The CDS is a contract entered between two parties, where the protection 
buyer pays a fee or a premium to the protection seller in order to acquire 
insurance against a credit event by a third party, i.e. the reference entity. This 
fee is measured in basic point (bps), which is one hundredth of a percentage 
point (0.01%) and is in most cases paid over the lifespan of the contract in 
form of regular payments. Hence the payment structure consists of payments 
from the protection buyer until the end of the contract or a credit event occurs. 
In case of a credit event, the payments come to an end and the protection 
seller will fulfill the contract by compensating the protection buyer with a 
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sum that reflects the face value the bond would have had in the absence of a 
credit event (O’Kane, Turnbull (2003)).  
 
Figure 1. Mechanics of a Credit Default Swap 
The reference entity is most commonly embodied as a bank, a corporate or a 
sovereign issuer and the legal jurisdictions can differ among the three. The 
CDS is designed to be triggered when the reference entity defaults, fails to 
pay up, is restructured or when any other credit event occurs. The contract 
itself could be tailor-made in order to suit the protection buyer or seller but 
the contracts are in fact most often standardized to increase the ability to sell 
and to simplify the trading procedure. The typical contract is over five years 
but might as well run over three, seven or any other number of years. If a 
credit event occurs and the reference entity fails to deliver its payments the 
contract stipulates that there will be a settlement between the protected buyer 
and the protected seller. This settlement will be reached either as a cash 
settlement or as a physical settlement. If there would to be a physical 
settlement the protection seller will pay a pre-determined amount (usually 
equals to the face value of the debt) and in exchange overtake the remaining 
value of the debt, a value which usually is significantly smaller than the face 
value of the debt after a credit event. The term “physical” is referring to the 
fact that the bond is physically delivered to the protection seller in exchange 
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for cash. If the contract stipulates a cash-settlement, the protection seller will 
have to deliver the cash difference between the remaining value of the debt 
and what would have been its face value. The remaining value of the 
defaulted bond is often determined a couple of weeks after the credit event 
has taken place by a dealer poll (O’Kane, Turnbull (2003)).  
N (1-R)
N (1-R)
Nc/4
Nc/4 Nc/4
Nc/4 Nc/4 Nc/4
Nc/4
Nc/4 Nc/4
Nc/4 Nc/4 Nc/4
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N (1-R)
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Figure 2. Payoff of a CDS contract 
We now give a simple example of how CDS works. Assume a bond, which 
has the face value of $5 million and the yearly credit spread is measured at 
400bps. In case of payment structure that stipulates semi-annual payments, 
the protection buyer will pay a fee that equals 0.04 0.5 $5 million = $100000. 
This means that the protection buyer pays a fee of $100000 every six months 
until the end of the contract or until a credit event which ever happens first. 
Now lets assume that if a credit event occurs and the insured asset will have a 
value equals $35 per $100 of the face value the following payments will look 
as followed. The protection seller compensates the buyer with the difference 
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between the face value and the current value of the asset. This in term 
measures as $5 million ($100 - $35) = $ 3.25 million. 
The protection buyer fulfills the contract by paying the remaining accrued 
interest that counts from the date of the latest down payment. That could 
equal for example 0.04 * 2/12 *5 million = 200000 if the last payment occurred 
two months ago （O’Kane, Turnbull (2003)）. 
What is examined in this paper will mainly be one approach to how this 
spread that determines the fee is valued. And try to analyze how the results 
correspond to the markets valuation. 
As mentioned before, CDS is among the most widely used credit derivatives, 
representing over thirty percent of the credit derivatives market. Although 
the form of CDS had been in existence from at least the early 1990s, the 
modern CDS were invented in 1997 and initially for banks to transfer the risk 
of default on their loans to the third party. However, as the market matured, 
CDS became to be used less by banks seeking to hedge against default and 
more by investors wishing to bet for or against the likelihood that particular 
companies or portfolios would suffer financial difficulties, as well as those 
seeking to profit from perceived mispricing. The market size for CDS began to 
grow rapidly from 2003, and by the end of 2007, the CDS market had a 
notional value of $45 trillion. But notional amount began to fall during 2008 
and by the end of 2008 notional amount outstanding had fallen 38 percent to 
$38.6 trillion. (ISDA Market Survey) However, it is important to note that 
since default is a relatively rare occurrence and in most CDS contracts the 
only payments are the spread payments from buyer to seller. Thus, although 
the notional amount of the outstanding CDS contracts sounds very large, the 
net cash flows are generally only a small fraction of this total.  
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It is worth noticing that after 2005, the notional amount of the outstanding 
CDS contracts started to surpass the total amount of the bank and non-bank 
loan plus corporate and foreign bonds and in 2007, the former is four times 
big as the latter. This, we think, implies the excessive use of CDS as a 
preferable instrument for speculating and arbitraging. And again, it draws the 
attention of the possible mispricing of CDS spread. (ISDA Market Survey, 
FED) 
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Figure 3. Notional amount of outstanding CDS contract   
2.2. Term Structure 
The term structure or the yield curve as it is usually referred to explains the 
relationship between the interest rate and time to maturity. The term yield 
curve could take different shapes and could hence be upwards sloping, 
downwards sloping or humped shaped. In economic theory it is most 
common to assume an increasing term structure, i.e. an upward-sloping yield 
curve. The reasoning behind this includes assumptions about interest rate risk 
where investors want compensation for tying down an investment. The 
assumptions around the term-structure are central in the buildup of the Hull 
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and White (2000) model and will be discussed in detail later on. (Options, 
Futures and Other Derivatives, Hull 2005) 
2.3. Credit Pricing Models 
Credit pricing models can be divided into two main categories: 
structural-form models and reduced-form models. Structural models are 
based on the original framework developed by Merton (1974) using the 
principles of Black and Scholes option pricing where the risk of a firm’s 
default is linked to the variability of the firm’s asset value. The intuition 
behind the Merton model is: default occurs when the value of a firm’s assets, 
i.e. the market value of the firm, is lower than that of its liabilities. Therefore 
the payment to the debtholders at maturity is the smaller than the face value 
of the debt or the market value of the firm’s assets. Assuming the firm’s debt 
is entirely represented by a zero-coupon bond, at maturity, if the value of the 
firm is larger than the face value of the bond, then the bondholder gets back 
the face value of the bond; if the value of the firm is smaller than the face 
value of the bond, default occurs and the bondholders get the market value of 
the firm. Therefore, the payoff at maturity to the bondholder is the face value 
of the bond minus a put option on the value of the firm’s assets, with the 
exercising price equal to the face value of the bond and a maturity equals to 
the bond’s maturity, i.e. payoff = F-min[0, V-F]. Following this basic intuition, 
Merton developed an explicit formula for risky bonds which can be used to 
estimate both the default probability of a firm and the credit spread between a 
risky bond and a default-free bond. 
Structural-form model has certain advantages: they use market prices; they 
have a forward perspective rather than a historical one and they consider the 
credit events not unpredictable, i.e. default is an endogenous factor. 
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However, some assumptions of Merton’s framework are unrealistic. Black 
and Cox (1976) released the assumption of no seniority difference among 
bonds issued by the same firm by introducing the possibility of more complex 
capital structures, with subordinated debt; Geske (1977) introduced 
coupon-paying bond; Vasicek (1984) introduced the distinction between short 
and long term liabilities. There are a set of models under Merton’s framework 
but remove the assumption that default can only happen at maturity when 
the firm’s assets value are no longer to cover the debt obligation, including 
Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Hull and White (1995), Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995) among others. These models introduce a default barrier 
where credit event may occur anytime between the issuance and maturity 
when the value of the firm’s assets hits the default barrier. However, for all 
structural-form models, the biggest problem is that the firm’s assets value is 
most commonly not observable which makes these models difficult to 
implement in practice. 
Reduced-form models are introduced with the aim of overcoming the 
shortcomings of structural-form models. These models include Litterman and 
Iben (1991), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), 
Lando (1998), Duffie and Singleton (1999), Duffie (1999). The model we are 
examining in this paper, Hull and White (2000) is also included in this set. 
Reduced-form models do not condition default on the value of the firm’s 
assets hence parameters related to the firm’s assets value need not be 
estimated to implement the model. Noticeably, although all these models 
have the objective of obtaining the spread of risky bond rates over default-free 
bond rates, under the non-arbitrage assumption, considerable differences can 
be found among different reduced-form approaches due to the different input 
information required and different specification on the event of default and 
recovery rate. 
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Comparing these two classes of models, we can see the fundamental 
hypothesis of structural-form models is that the modeler has continuous 
information on the firm’s assets value, which in many cases result in the 
prediction of the firm’s default while in reduced-form models the information 
required is less refined, which is the reason for the fact that default time is 
seen as unpredictable. However, Jarrow et al (2004) shows that “these models 
are not disconnected and disjoint models types as is commonly supposed, but 
rather they are really the same model containing different informational 
assumptions”, “Indeed, structural models can be transformed into reduced 
form models as the information set changes and becomes less refined, from 
that observable by the firm’s management to that which is observed by the 
market.” 
Since our goal is to price CDS spread, and the firm’s assets value process is 
unobservable by the market, we will apply Hull and White (2000) among the 
reduced-form models. 
3. The Hull and White Model  
  3.1. Estimating Default Probabilities at Discrete Times 
In order to present the Hull and White (2000) model it’s convenient to define 
the different parameters variables used. Beneath, are the components used for 
the formula of calculating risk-neutral probabilities. 
jB  : Price of the j th bond today 
jG  : Price of the j th bond today if there were no probability of default  
)(tF j : Forward price of the j th bond for a forward contract maturing at time 
t , assuming the bond is default-free ( jtt < ) 
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)(tC j : Claim made by holders of the j th bond if there is a default at time t , 
( jtt < ) 
)(tv : Present value of $1 received at time t  with certainty  
)(tR j : Recovery rate for holders of the j th bond in the event of a default at 
time t , ( jtt < ) 
ijα  : Present value of the loss, relative to the value of the bond would have 
if there were no possibility of default, from a default on the j th bond 
at time it   
ip : The risk-neutral probability of default at time it   
In this model, Hull and White use the Treasury bond as a proxy of 
default-free bond hence Gj is the price of a Treasury bond promising the same 
cash flows as the jth defaultable bond and the valuation of the CDS spread is 
determined by the fact that default only occurs at the reference entity and that 
no counterparty default risk is present. Hence the model only takes into 
account that the reference entity could default and not the protection seller. 
The Hull and White model is based on the assumptions that are used in most 
cases with the reduced-form model framework and presumes that interest 
rates, default probabilities and recovery rates are independent and 
exogenously given. The model can then be tested on its sensitivity to different 
factors like claim amount by bondholders and recovery rate.  
The first step to retrieve any results is to acquire risk-neutral default 
probabilities, as they are the key elements in the final equation of calculating 
CDS spread. In order to attain these default probabilities we need to make an 
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assumption on yield spreads, which is that, the difference between a 
defaultable bond yield and a default-free bond yield only captures the risk of 
default. With this assumption taken into account, we can extract the price of 
default in the difference in yield between the two bonds. We can construct 
yield curves out of bonds issued by a reference entity and with a comparison 
to the curve constructed by the default-free bonds we get default probabilities 
at different times to maturity. Since Hull and White (2000) are using the 
treasury rate as the proxy for the default-free bond, we need a corporate yield 
curve, a treasury curve and an assumption about recovery rate to get a simple 
estimate. 
Let us take a very simplifying example of how this risk-neutral probability is 
calculated and we will then show how it was done in our study. If we for 
example have a default-free and a defaultable bond that both matures in five 
years and the zero coupon return rate is 3% and 4% respectively. If both 
bonds have a face value of $100 the cost of default in a risk neutral world 
would be  
1977.4)100()100( 503.0504.0 =− ×−×− ee  
With the value of the default we can now incorporate the risk neutral default 
probability, which is defined as pj. With the information above and the 
assumption and no recovery rate it gives that  
1977.4100 503.0 =×−pe  
which gives a value on p = 4.3%. This way of retrieving risk-neutral default 
probabilities is central in the build-up of the model. And an issue of important 
notice is that the example above does not take into account the fact that the 
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recovery rate of a bond is in most cases not zero as described above and the 
corporate bond is rarely found to be a zero coupon bond.  
With a non-zero recovery rate the equation looks a bit different. In addition to 
the recovery rate we also need to make an assumption about the claim of the 
bondholders. Hull and White (2000) argue that the most applicable 
assumption probably is the face value of the defaultable bon plus the accrued 
interest. Given these assumptions we can now get an equation that gives us 
the payoff for a CDS. 
L - RL[1 + A(t)] = L[1 – R - A(t)]                       (1) 
Where L equals the face value, R is the recovery rate and A(t) is the accrued 
interest at the time of default.  If we extend this analysis to a set where we 
have a number of bonds, N, given by a reference entity. The various bonds 
should have different times to maturity and default if this case can happen at 
any of the maturity dates of the bonds. The maturity of the ith bond with the 
condition that t1 < t2 < t3… < tN 
To apply this in a discrete time framework as we are using through out this 
paper we need a situation where we collect a number of bonds from the same 
firm issued at the same date. These bonds should have different dates to 
maturity and also be within the same seniority i.e. the bonds have the same 
structural body in case of a default. The model now enables us to get a default 
probability at any of the different maturity dates of the bonds that the 
reference entity has issued given the assumption that a credit event actually 
can happen at any of these occasions.   
If the claim and the recovery rates are observed and known in advance we 
can get something that looks like equation (2). Given that the bondholder 
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make a claim equal to Cj(ti) and given that we have a present value of the loss 
that equals to αij it is possible to get the following. 
)]()()()[( ijijijiij tCtRtFtv −=α                                          (2) 
Addressing the problem in similar fashion as in the very first and simple 
example where we had no recovery we can obtain the incurred probability of 
the loss. This we can get using a formula for the total value of all the losses 
from all the bonds used.  
           (3) 
Well with this expression in hand we can use this to solve for the probabilities 
inductively.  
( )11jj j j iji
j
jj
G B p
p
α
α
−
=
− −
=
∑
                           (4) 
With equation (4) we now have a formula that allows us to extract the 
risk-neutral probabilities of default from observed bond prices. 
Given these results the first step to calculating a CDS-premium is 
accomplished. Hull and White (2000), advances with further extensions 
testing the models sensitivity for recovery rate, allowing default to happen at 
any time and investigations regarding the claim amount. Since those 
extensions are irrelevant to the discrete-time framework we will not go in to 
greater detail about that. 
3.2. The Model’s precondition 
In the way the model is constructed certain preconditions have to be satisfied 
in order to validate the model. For one thing the probability function from 
equation (4) must be greater that zero. This gives that 
1
j
j j j ijiG B p α=− −∑
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∑
−
−
−≤ 1
1
j
i ijjjj pGB α                                                   (5) 
The second fundamental condition that must be satisfied for the model to give 
satisfactory results is that the cumulative probability needs to be less than one, 
which gives following expression. 
)(1)(
1
1
11 ∑
−
=
−−
−−≤−
j
i
iiijjj ttpttp                                          (6) 
this enables us to use equation (4) to get following results 






−−
−
−−≥ ∑∑
−
=
−
−
−
=
1
1
1
1
1
1
)(1
j
i
iii
jj
jj
ij
j
i
ijj ttptt
pGB
α
α                            (7) 
The equations above suggest that there is a boundary where the yield can 
move within. Once the recovery rate is set, equation (6) and (7) can be used to 
validate if the bond yields are applicable on the chosen recovery rate. If there 
are any discrepancies we have reason to believe that either the recovery rate 
assumption is out of fit or we have mispriced bonds. 
4. Application of the model 
  4.1. Simplified assumptions 
The model that will be more thoroughly examined in this thesis is the early 
and simplified version of the Hull and White (2000) with a discrete time 
framework. The reasoning behind the choice of the model is based on a few 
factors. One main advantage of using the simpler version is the fact that it has 
a pedagogical value and contributes with an easy insight to how a reduced- 
form model is constructed. The downside, however, is the probable loss of 
accuracy due to the fact that some values and calculations might suffer a bit in 
their estimations due to lack of scrutiny in the mathematical part. Our hope 
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nevertheless is that this simple version still captures the explanatory features 
of the reduced-form model sufficiently and gives an insightful guidance of 
how the different features and mechanisms are constructed. More advanced 
structure of the reduced-form models requires a substantial addition of 
complex and complicated mathematical features and would on this level of 
studies shift the focus to technicalities instead of capturing the core essence 
behind them.  
To point out the differences between the Hull and White model and how it is 
implemented in this paper, it is important to stress that this paper only limits 
the analysis to discrete time framework. The major difference between a 
credit risk model in a discrete time framework and continuous time 
framework is that in discrete timeframe, default can only happen at maturity 
whereas in continuous timeframe, default can also happen anytime before 
maturity. With this known, it is easy to see that the concept of accrued 
interests is redundant in our application, i.e. 0)( =tA . As for the assumption 
on the amount claim by the debtholders at the event of default, we adopt the 
Hull and White assumption of the claim equals the face value of the debt plus 
accrued interests and as explained above, accrued interests always equals to 
zero in our application hence the claim, )(tC , always equals to the face value 
of the debt.  
  4.2. Data 
The choice of data in this study is limited to only incorporate U.S. based 
companies. The reason behind this is associated with the fact that we use 
US-Treasuries as proxy for the default-free bond. Apart from the regional 
choice limitations in data availability restricts the possibility to choose freely 
among US companies.  
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With the date 15th of May, 2009 used as a standing point, we collected 
information about zero-coupon Treasuries with time to maturity of three 
months, six months and one year. In addition to that coupon-paying 
US-Treasuries that matured in 1.5 years, 2 years,…,5 years. Same shall be 
implemented on corporate bonds, however a majority of the corporate 
zero-coupon bonds have very peculiar price, which made them unfit to use as 
inputs in the model. For example a corporate zero-coupon bond with three 
months to maturity was 1.5 times its face value. As a result, we collected only 
the prices of coupon-paying corporate bonds with different time to maturities. 
Further limitations of choice is handed by the fact that corporate bonds need 
to be interpolated in order to acquire the zero-rate curve. This limits the 
choice to companies with a numbers of outstanding bonds maturing between 
one and five years and reduces our sample to 20 companies. The chosen 
bonds in the sample are all senior bonds with semi-annual coupon payments, 
in order to maximize the coherence between the chosen samples.  
The CDS data is collected through both Datastream and Reuters although 
there is only minor difference between the CDS quotes from these two 
databases. We collected CDS quote for only senior bonds, maturity 1 to 5 
years. For simplicity all CDS spread data are mid quote data which is an 
average value of the bid and ask quotes. 
  4.3. Valuation of the CDS spread 
For the valuation of the plain vanilla CDS a couple of additional parameters 
other than default probability need to be added in order to reach the final 
result. Previous assumptions are still need to be held, which means that 
recovery rates, default events and interest rates are all independent and that 
defaults can happen at any maturity date. 
Definitions are as follows: 
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T : Life of credit default swap 
)(tp : Risk-neutral default probability at time t 
R : Expected recovery rate of a reference entity in a risk neutral world. The 
recovery rate is expected to be independent of time; hence it takes on the 
same value regardless at what time a default occurs. 
)(tu : Present value of payments at the rate of $1 per year on payment dates 
between time zero and time t. 
)(te : Present value of an accrual payment at time t equal to t-t* where t* is the 
payment date immediately preceding time t. 
)(tv : Present value of $1 received at time t. 
w : Total payments per year made by credit default swap buyer 
s : Value of w that causes the credit default swap to have a value of zero. 
pi : The risk neutral probability of no credit event during the life of the swap. 
)(tA : Accrued interest of the reference obligation at time t as a percent of face 
value. 
The above presented probability of no default occurring can be written as and 
could be calculated from )(tp . 
∑
=
−=
T
t
tp
1
)(1pi
                                                      (8) 
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Another new parameter that is introduced now is the payments w , and they 
will last until there is a credit event occurs or to the end of the CDS contract, 
which of them ever happens first. Should a default occur at time t (t<T) the 
present value of the payments made by the protection buyer is w[u(t) + e(t)]. 
Should no default occur the present value of the payments is simply wu(t). 
With this given the expected present value of the payments is given by the 
equation below. 
[ ]∑
=
++
T
t
Tuwtetutp
1
)()()()( pi
                                           (9) 
Using the same assumption as we had in equation (1) we get the risk-neutral 
expected payoff from a CDS that looks like 
[ ] ___ )(1)(11 RtARRtA −−=+−                                          (10) 
The present value of the expected payoff given from the CDS then becomes 
∑
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                                            (11) 
To the buyer the value of a CDS is naturally the expected payoff in a case of a 
default minus the payments that is already made. 
[ ] )()()()()()()(1 __ TwutetuTwptvtpRtAR pi−+=



−−
                      (12) 
The CDS spread is then the value of w  that makes the expression above 
equals to zero. The equation for the CDS spread can then be derived as shown 
below. 
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The equation above gives us the total payments over a year expressed in 
percentage of the face value for a recently issued CDS. This equation now 
enables us to use the data collected to calculate the default probabilities and 
therefore the CDS spread presented in percentage. The spread is expressed 
annually, which coheres with the way the default probabilities are calculated.  
If a plain non-arbitrage reasoning is used it is possible to determinate the CDS 
spread, s , with this simple reasoning. If we have a situation where an 
investor holds a long position on a defaultable bond over T years and the 
equivalent CDS respectively the investor would be insured against most of 
the risk associated with the investment. The net return on this investment 
would then be sy −  given that y  is the annual yield of the bond and s  is 
the spread. Without an arbitrage opportunity this investment should equal to 
the proxy of the risk free alternative i.e. the Treasury bond denoted as x . If 
that reasoning wouldn’t hold an arbitrageur would find an opportunity to 
benefit from the difference. Given this reasoning xy −  should equal the CDS 
spread. 
   4.3.1. Treasury Zero Curve 
To get the zero curve for U.S. Treasury bond, we use the bootstrap method. 
Standing on May 15, 2009, it is possible to find U.S. Treasury bonds mature in 
exact 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 1.5 years,…, up to 5 years. In order to 
bootstrap the zero curve, we find zero-coupon Treasury bond for time to 
maturity 3 months, 6 months and 1 year and semi-annual coupon paying 
Treasury bonds for time to maturity onwards till 5 years. Because the first 
three bonds pay no coupons, the zero rates corresponding to the maturites of 
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these bonds can easily be calculated. The 3-month bond provides a return of 
0.0501 in 3 months on an initial investment of 99.9499. With quarterly 
compounding, the 3-month zero rate is %2005.09499.99/)0501.04( =×  per 
annum. When the rate is expressed with continuous compounding, it 
becomes 
002005.0)
4
002005.01ln(4 =+
 
or 0.2005% per annum. The 6-month bond provides a return of 0.16 in 6 
months on an initial investment of 99.84. With semi-annual compounding the 
6-month rate is %3205.084.99/)16.02( =×  per annum. When the rate is 
expressed with continuous compounding, it becomes 
003203.0)
2
003205.01ln(2 =+
 
or 0.3203% per annum. Similarly, the 1-year rate with continuous 
compounding is  
004922.0)
509.99
491.01ln( =+
 
or 0.4922% per annum. 
The forth bond lasts 1.5 years. The payments are as follows: 
6 months: $2.25 
1 year: $2.25 
1.5 years: $102.25 
From our earlier calculation, we know that the discount rate for the payment 
at the end of 6 months is 0.3203% and that the discount rate for the payment 
at the end of 1 year is 0.4922%. We also know that the bond’s price, $105.6929, 
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must equal the present value of all the payments received by the bondholder. 
Suppose the 1.5-year zero rate is denoted by R. It follows that 
6929.10525.10225.225.2 5.10.100049225.0003203,0 =++ ×−×−×− Reee  
Using Goal Seeking function in Excel, we easily get R=0.021342. The 1.5-year 
zero rate is therefore 2.1342%.  
Similarly, we calculated the 2-year, 2.5-year,…, up to 5-year zero rates and 
they are summarized in Table 1.  
  F T C P Yield Zero rate 
2009-8-15 100 0.25 0 99.9499 0.002005 0.002005 
2009-11-15 100 0.5 0 99.84 0.003205 0.003203 
2010-5-15 100 1 0 99.509 0.004934 0.004922 
2010-11-15 100 1.5 4.5 105.6929  0.021342 
2011-5-15 100 2 4.875 107.9728  0.020049 
2011-11-15 100 2.5 1.75 101.7022  0.013921 
2012-5-15 100 3 1.375 100.2532  0.015075 
2012-11-15 100 3.5 4 109.017  0.018943 
2013-5-15 100 4 3.625 107.7873  0.020417 
2013-11-15 100 4.5 4.25 110.4174  0.022878 
2014-5-15 100 5 4.75 113.1637  0.024378 
2014-11-15 100 5.5 4.25 110.9799  0.025084 
2015-5-15 100 6 4.125 110.1274   0.024213 
Table 1. Bootstrapped U.S. Treasury Zero Rates （*F: Face value of the bond. T: Time to 
maturity. C: Coupon payment (all coupons are paid semi-annually). P: bond price. ） 
We also find the U.S zero curve from Datastream and we compare it with our 
bootstrapped zero curve.  
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Figure 4. Bootstrapped Zero Rate and Quoted Zero Rate 
From the figure above we can see that our bootstrapped zero curve goes 
closer to the Datastream zero curve as time to maturity increases. However, 
with shorter time to maturity, the difference is quite significant. As model 
input, however, we think it is more appropriate to use the quoted U.S. zero 
rate rather than bootstrapped zero rates. The reason is that the bond prices we 
used for the bootstrapping method contains other information than credit risk 
and the actual curve is more likely a smooth upward-sloping curve.  
4.3.2 Corporate Zero Curve  
To address the fact that most of the corporate bonds used in the sample had 
coupons we need to discount back the values of the coupons in order to get a 
zero curve. This is necessary in order to have a curve that is comparable to the 
Treasury curve used. The formula used to discount the cash-flows from the 
coupons is shown below. 
t
r
CPV )1( +=                                                       (14) 
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where r is a feature of the economy, hence the equivalent Treasury rate. 
Should there be more than one coupon the equation can be written as 
∑
=
+
=
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C
PV
1 )1(
 
but since we can not use the same r for different t we need to use a formula 
where r changes with t 
∑
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Let us assume we have an example where a coupon-paying bond has three 
payment dates and a final payment. The coupon size is $6 and the final 
payment is $106, if the relevant interests are 6.611, 6.786, 6.982 and 7.190 
respectively the discounted values will be: 5.811, 5.619, 5.422, 92.257. The 
present value then sums to 109.11, which gives a zero-yield of 9.11%. 
This procedure is then repeated for all the bonds in the sample respectively to 
get the yield used for calculating the risk-neutral probabilities of default. 
After calculating a several zero-rates along the time line, linear interpolation 
was needed on corporate yields in order to attain the zero-rates for the 
preferred dates. To come around this problem, two corporate bonds are 
chosen. One that matures as close prior to the Treasury and another one that 
matures as close subsequently as possible. From these two bonds a linear 
interpolation is made to find a new bond price that matches the given date of 
the Treasury. With the interpolated result there is a possibility to compare the 
yield of the Treasury with to corporate on and out of that get a measurement 
of the probability that’s sought after. 
   4.3.3. Default Probabilities and CDS spread 
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With the attained zero rates, we are now able to calculate the default 
probabilities and further CDS spread with different time to maturities for 
each company in sample with different assumptions on recovery rate. All 
calculations are done in Excel and the results are presented below.  
Company name/T 1 2 3 4 5 
Alcoa 3.32% 7.02% 9.77% 12.01% 14.49% 
Bancorp 1.03% 2.12% 2.99% 3.88% 4.93% 
Berkshire Hathaway 0.64% 1.37% 2.07% 2.82% 4.56% 
Burlington Industries 1.02% 2.68% 4.62% 5.56% 8.21% 
Capital One  3.59% 7.21% 10.47% 13.51% 16.77% 
Cardinal Health 2.57% 4.90% 6.73% 8.20% 10.15% 
Caterpillar Financial  1.24% 2.66% 4.32% 5.93% 8.95% 
Citigroup 2.53% 7.62% 11.29% 14.36% 17.18% 
Coca-Cola  1.11% 2.07% 2.62% 2.82% 4.03% 
Eli Lilly and Company  0.61% 1.22% 1.59% 2.00% 2.60% 
Ford Credit 15.51% 28.39% 37.92% 43.24% 46.36% 
General Electric  1.67% 3.10% 5.02% 6.73% 7.45% 
Goldman Sachs Group 1.55% 3.47% 5.23% 6.56% 7.92% 
Kraft Foods 1.49% 3.34% 4.16% 5.22% 5.86% 
Nucor  1.53% 2.82% 3.62% 4.24% 4.83% 
Prudential Financial 3.68% 7.43% 10.83% 13.05% 15.01% 
Union Pacific 0.55% 2.99% 4.60% 6.72% 8.72% 
United Technologies  0.63% 1.38% 2.31% 3.05% 3.97% 
Wal-Mart Stores 0.30% 0.72% 1.40% 2.29% 2.83% 
Walt Disney  0.60% 1.21% 2.14% 2.53% 3.62% 
Table 2. Cumulative Default Probability with Recovery Rate 30% 
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Company name/T 1 2 3 4 5 
Alcoa 2.85% 6.02% 8.38% 10.29% 12.42% 
Bancorp 0.89% 1.82% 2.56% 3.33% 4.23% 
Berkshire Hathaway 0.55% 1.17% 1.77% 2.41% 3.91% 
Burlington Industries 0.87% 2.30% 3.96% 4.77% 7.04% 
Capital One  3.07% 6.18% 8.98% 11.58% 14.38% 
Cardinal Health 2.20% 4.20% 5.77% 7.03% 8.70% 
Caterpillar Financial  1.06% 2.28% 3.70% 5.09% 7.68% 
Citigroup 2.17% 6.53% 9.67% 12.31% 14.72% 
Coca-Cola  0.96% 1.77% 2.25% 2.42% 3.46% 
Eli Lilly and Company  0.52% 1.04% 1.36% 1.71% 2.23% 
Ford Credit 13.29% 24.33% 32.51% 37.06% 39.74% 
General Electric  1.44% 2.65% 4.30% 5.77% 6.39% 
Goldman Sachs Group 1.33% 2.97% 4.49% 5.62% 6.79% 
Kraft Foods 1.27% 2.86% 3.57% 4.47% 5.02% 
Nucor  1.32% 2.42% 3.11% 3.63% 4.14% 
Prudential Financial 3.15% 6.37% 9.28% 11.18% 12.86% 
Union Pacific 0.48% 2.56% 3.95% 5.76% 7.47% 
United Technologies  0.54% 1.19% 1.98% 2.61% 3.40% 
Wal-Mart Stores 0.26% 0.62% 1.20% 1.96% 2.42% 
Walt Disney  0.51% 1.04% 1.83% 2.17% 3.10% 
Table 3. Cumulative Default Probabilities with Recovery Rate 40% 
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Company name/T 1 2 3 4 5 
Alcoa 2.37% 5.01% 6.98% 8.58% 10.35% 
Bancorp 0.74% 1.52% 2.13% 2.77% 3.52% 
Berkshire Hathaway 0.45% 0.98% 1.48% 2.01% 3.26% 
Burlington Industries 0.73% 1.91% 3.30% 3.97% 5.86% 
Capital One  2.56% 5.15% 7.48% 9.65% 11.98% 
Cardinal Health 1.83% 3.50% 4.81% 5.85% 7.25% 
Caterpillar Financial  0.89% 1.90% 3.08% 4.24% 6.40% 
Citigroup 1.80% 5.44% 8.06% 10.26% 12.27% 
Coca-Cola  0.80% 1.48% 1.87% 2.02% 2.88% 
Eli Lilly and Company  0.43% 0.87% 1.14% 1.43% 1.86% 
Ford Credit 11.08% 20.28% 27.09% 30.89% 33.12% 
General Electric  1.20% 2.21% 3.59% 4.80% 5.32% 
Goldman Sachs Group 1.11% 2.48% 3.74% 4.68% 5.66% 
Kraft Foods 1.06% 2.38% 2.97% 3.73% 4.19% 
Nucor  1.10% 2.02% 2.59% 3.03% 3.45% 
Prudential Financial 2.63% 5.30% 7.73% 9.32% 10.72% 
Union Pacific 0.40% 2.14% 3.29% 4.80% 6.23% 
United Technologies  0.45% 0.99% 1.65% 2.18% 2.83% 
Wal-Mart Stores 0.22% 0.51% 1.00% 1.64% 2.02% 
Walt Disney  0.43% 0.87% 1.53% 1.81% 2.58% 
Table 4. Cumulative Default Probabilities with Recovery Rate 50% 
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Company name/T 1 2 3 4 5 
Alcoa 233  495  700  877  1019  
Bancorp 72  150  214  284  351  
Berkshire Hathaway 45  96  148  205  318  
Burlington Industries 71  189  329  406  570  
Capital One  251  509  749  983  1166  
Cardinal Health 180  346  482  600  718  
Caterpillar Financial  87  187  308  431  617  
Citigroup 177  536  806  1044  1200  
Coca-Cola  78  146  189  209  287  
Eli Lilly and Company  42  86  114  147  186  
Ford Credit 1086  2000  2699  3119  3230  
General Electric  117  219  359  490  535  
Goldman Sachs Group 109  244  374  479  563  
Kraft Foods 104  235  299  383  423  
Nucor  107  199  261  312  350  
Prudential Financial 257  524  774  952  1064  
Union Pacific 39  210  328  487  610  
United Technologies  44  98  165  222  282  
Wal-Mart Stores 21  51  100  165  201  
Walt Disney  42  86  152  185  256  
Table 5. Theoretical CDS spread with Recovery Rate 30% 
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Company name/T 1 2 3 4 5 
Alcoa 171  364  514  645  752  
Bancorp 53  110  157  209  258  
Berkshire Hathaway 33  71  109  151  234  
Burlington Industries 52  139  242  298  420  
Capital One  184  374  551  723  861  
Cardinal Health 132  254  355  441  529  
Caterpillar Financial  64  138  227  317  455  
Citigroup 130  394  592  767  886  
Coca-Cola  57  107  139  154  211  
Eli Lilly and Company  31  63  84  108  137  
Ford Credit 798  1470  1986  2299  2390  
General Electric  86  161  264  360  393  
Goldman Sachs Group 80  179  275  352  415  
Kraft Foods 76  173  220  281  311  
Nucor  79  146  192  229  257  
Prudential Financial 189  385  569  700  784  
Union Pacific 29  154  241  358  449  
United Technologies  32  72  121  163  207  
Wal-Mart Stores 16  37  73  122  147  
Walt Disney  31  63  112  136  188  
Table 6. Theoretical CDS Spread with Recovery Rate 40% 
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Company name/T 1 2 3 4 5 
Alcoa 119  253  357  448  524  
Bancorp 37  76  109  145  180  
Berkshire Hathaway 23  49  76  105  163  
Burlington Industries 36  96  168  207  293  
Capital One  128  260  383  502  601  
Cardinal Health 92  176  246  307  369  
Caterpillar Financial  44  96  157  220  317  
Citigroup 90  274  411  533  618  
Coca-Cola  40  75  96  107  147  
Eli Lilly and Company  22  44  58  75  95  
Ford Credit 554  1021  1381  1602  1672  
General Electric  60  112  183  250  274  
Goldman Sachs Group 55  125  191  245  289  
Kraft Foods 53  120  153  195  217  
Nucor  55  102  133  159  179  
Prudential Financial 131  267  395  487  547  
Union Pacific 20  107  168  249  313  
United Technologies  23  50  84  113  144  
Wal-Mart Stores 11  26  51  84  102  
Walt Disney  21  44  78  95  131  
Table 7. Theoretical CDS Spread with Recovery Rate 50% 
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   4.3.4. Theoretical CDS spread and Quoted CDS spread 
  Alcoa         Ford Credit     
T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 
1  475  233  171  119  1  1349  1086  798  554  
2  503  495  364  253  2  1176  2000  1470  1021  
3  522  700  514  357  3  1068  2699  1986  1381  
4  531  877  645  448  4  988  3119  2299  1602  
5  558  1019  752  524  5  966  3230  2390  1672  
  Bancorp         General Electric      
T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 
1  NA 72  53  37  1  NA 117  86  60  
2  NA 150  110  76  2  NA 219  161  112  
3  NA 214  157  109  3  NA 359  264  183  
4  NA 284  209  145  4  NA 490  360  250  
5  NA 351  258  180  5  NA 535  393  274  
  Berkshire Hathaway     Goldman Sachs Group   
T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 
1  352  45  33  23  1  186  109  80  55  
2  345  96  71  49  2  181  244  179  125  
3  338  148  109  76  3  180  374  275  191  
4  327  205  151  105  4  183  479  352  245  
5  321  318  234  163  5  184  563  415  289  
  Burlington Industries     Kraft Foods     
T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 
1  NA 71  52  36  1  50  104  76  53  
2  NA 189  139  96  2  58  235  173  120  
3  NA 329  242  168  3  61  299  220  153  
4  NA 406  298  207  4  68  383  281  195  
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5  NA 570  420  293  5  73  423  311  217  
  Capital One        Nucor        
T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 
1  302  251  184  128  1  72  107  79  55  
2  261  509  374  260  2  80  199  146  102  
3  247  749  551  383  3  89  261  192  133  
4  227  983  723  502  4  97  312  229  159  
5  215  1166  861  601  5  102  350  257  179  
  Cardinal Health       Prudential Financial   
T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 
1  43  180  132  92  1  519  257  189  131  
2  46  346  254  176  2  541  524  385  267  
3  48  482  355  246  3  565  774  569  395  
4  51  600  441  307  4  581  952  700  487  
5  52  718  529  369  5  590  1064  784  547  
  Caterpillar Financial      Union Pacific     
T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 
1  246  87  64  44  1  61  39  29  20  
2  248  187  138  96  2  66  210  154  107  
3  249  308  227  157  3  68  328  241  168  
4  250  431  317  220  4  71  487  358  249  
5  251  617  455  317  5  73  610  449  313  
  Citigroup       United Technologies    
T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 
1  486  177  130  90  1  50  44  32  23  
2  452  536  394  274  2  55  98  72  50  
3  440  806  592  411  3  59  165  121  84  
4  424  1044  767  533  4  65  222  163  113  
5  413  1200  886  618  5  73  282  207  144  
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  Coca-Cola        Wal-Mart Stores     
T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 
1  33  78  57  40  1  59  21  16  11  
2  43  146  107  75  2  69  51  37  26  
3  48  189  139  96  3  72  100  73  51  
4  55  209  154  107  4  77  165  122  84  
5  60  287  211  147  5  79  201  147  102  
  Eli Lilly and Company      Walt Disney      
T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 T Quoted R=0.3 R=0.4 R=0.5 
1  37  42  31  22  1  60  42  31  21  
2  40  86  63  44  2  60  86  63  44  
3  44  114  84  58  3  61  152  112  78  
4  46  147  108  75  4  64  185  136  95  
5  48  186  137  95  5  66  256  188  131  
The result from the evaluation is presented in table 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. We 
can see when we inspect the results from the calculations of the risk-neutral 
default probabilities that the recovery rate assumption has an impact on the 
result. The probabilities of default are negatively correlated to the assumption 
about the recovery rate. We can see that the difference is greater with longer 
times to maturity. Ford for example experiences a difference in result of 
46.36% compares to 33.12% when the recovery rate is 30% and 50% 
respectively with five year to maturity. The same results, with one year to 
maturity are default probabilities of 15.51% and 11.08% i.e. recovery rate 
assumption have an increasing effect with time to maturity. Examining the 
result we can see that Ford had the notably highest probability of default and 
Wal-Mart exhibiting the lowest default probability.   If we look at the results 
from the calculated CDS spreads we can see that all of the companies of 
course have increasing spread over time, this is due to the feature of the 
model. What also can be observed is that all companies experience a convex 
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increase in spread over time. All companies have of course a negative 
correlation between spread and recovery rate. Looking at the tables where 
quoted CDS data is presented alongside the calculated results we can observe 
that the calculated results broadly tend to underestimate the CDS spread for 
shorter times to maturities and overestimate for longer time to maturities. 
This goes for almost all bonds and follows from the fact that quoted CDS 
spreads barely increases over time, something that the quoted ones do. The 
reason behind this will be discussed later on in the analysis.  
5. Analysis 
5.1. Interpretation of the Results  
Given the results that we have presented in the tables a clear pattern can be 
discovered. The obvious finding when spreads are calculated with the Hull 
and White model (2000) is that they are always increasing over time. There 
are no results acquired where we exhibit a decreasing spread over time or 
even a flat curve. This is obvious when we look upon how the model is 
constructed, since the model assumes that the corporate bond spread only 
captures default risk. This implies that cumulative probability has to increase 
at all times and that is what it will do as long as the corporate bond spreads 
are higher than the Treasury bonds. If this is not the case the model will give 
negative probabilities of default at times when the corporate bond yields a 
lower return than the Treasury rate. Given the quoted CDS data of almost all 
companies we have to conclude that this is a rather limited feature of the 
model. Since almost all quoted CDS data exhibit a very limited increase over 
time and in some cases it even decreases. This gives us reason to believe that 
the real CDS price incorporates other factors in the pricing mechanism and 
that the default probability measure does not consider having a strict positive 
relationship with time. When we look closer at for example the quoted data 
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on Citigroup and Capital One we note that they actually have a decreasing 
spread over time. This implies that investors assume a higher risk of default 
in the near future and an increasing default probability over time. The reason 
behind this phenomenon might be closely linked to business cycles and the 
assumption that the aftermath from the recent economic meltdown gives 
investors reason to assume that default is decreasing over time. This is 
something that the model is incapable to absorb due to its construction. Our 
findings conclude that the Hull and White model (2000), given the 
assumptions used have an approach towards how investors look at risk, with 
increasing risk aversion over time. This has to be matched to the current 
situation at the time when the bond prices were collected. This was at the late 
peak of the credit crisis when investor’s attitude towards risk has to be 
viewed as somewhat alternative to what’s normally assumed. With this in 
mind we could explain some of the discrepancies between the calculated 
results and the quoted CDS spreads.  
Another factor that might play part in how risk-neutral default probabilities 
are calculated is the fact that we are unable to construct a bootstrapped 
zero-curve from the corporate bonds. This is due to shortage of zero-coupon 
bonds needed for the procedure. It is debatable though if this would have 
made any difference in the observed calculated results. 
  5.2. Analysis of pricing error 
Pricing errors mainly come from four factors: unrealistic assumptions of the 
model, inappropriate proxies as model inputs, poor data quality, and the 
inaccurate techniques used when the model is applied.  
According to the fundamental assumption of Hull and White model, the 
credit spread captures only credit risk of the reference entity, which means, 
in a risk neutral world, at time t, the premium on a credit default swap for a 
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given reference entity with a term expiring at T should be equal to the yield 
on a par bond issued by the reference entity with maturity at time T minus 
the yield on a par non-defaultable bond with maturity at time T, or  
 CDS Premium(t,T) = Corporate Par Yield(t,T) – non-defaultable Par 
Yield(t,T) 
This implies that, in a frictionless market, if the CDS premium exceeds the par 
yield spread, an arbitrage profit could be captured by forming a portfolio that 
is long a default-free bond, short a corporate bond and short a CDS. If the 
CDS premium is less than the par yield spread, the opposite positions capture 
the arbitrage profits. 
However, a consensus has been reached that yield spread include, apart from 
credit risk, a liquidity premium, if nothing else, therefore the yield spread 
include a default component and a non-default component. From the results 
acquired it seems quite obvious that the non-defaultable component in the 
yield spread plays a rather big role and is hence affecting the results in a 
negative way. It can be argued that the non-default part seems to increase 
over time as the life of the bond gets bigger. 
The second factor of pricing errors goes hand in hand with the first factor. 
Government bonds, in most cases, the U.S. Treasury is considered the proxy 
of non-defaultable bond in credit models. However, using Treasury yield as 
model input increases the non-default component of the yield spread. First 
of all, U.S. Treasury bonds are among the most liquid securities in the world, 
while some corporate bonds trade only rarely, if at all. (here we can have a 
chart comparing trading volume of treasury and some of our bonds) If the 
corporate bond market prices liquidity, then the differential liquidity 
between the corporate bond market and Treasury market can cause a 
non-default premium to arise in the corporate bond market. Also, the return 
on corporate bonds is in most cases riskier than the return on government 
bonds therefore investors demand a risk premium for investing in corporate 
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bonds and that this risk premium is responsible for the non-default portion 
of the yield spread. The systematic portion of non-default component of 
corporate bond yield has been empirically tested using Fama and French 
factors and explains the non-default component of corporate bond yield 
positive. Thirdly, interest payments on government bonds are not taxed at 
the state level, while interest payments from corporate bonds are subject to 
state taxation. This asymmetric tax treatment causes higher-coupon rate 
corporate bonds ask for a larger spread as compensation. However, we don’t 
make any distinctions on bonds with different coupon rates. Furthermore, 
we interpolate the yields of bonds issued by the same reference entity 
regardless of coupon rate to get the zero curve, which may cause the 
cross-sectional comparison on spread/premium less meaningful.  
The bond data we use as model inputs is of rather poor quality. Subjecting to 
non-frequent trading, market segmentation, inefficient bond market, we 
believe that some bonds are not correctly priced. Furthermore, all our bond 
data is sourced from Thomson Datastream, which quotes pricing from a 
single dealer instead of actual trade prices from the market as a whole 
therefore there is a potential for bias.  
Some of the techniques we use to implement the model are not very 
appropriate as well. As described before, we calculate the Treasury zero 
curve. However, in order to attain the zero-curves for corporate bonds, linear 
interpolation is needed at times, particularly when there are only a small 
amount of bonds issued by a reference entity, since the Treasury and 
corporate bonds to be compared with yield curves should have the exact 
same time to maturity. To get a corresponding corporate curve to the zero 
curve we obtained, we need to find bonds that mature at the same dates as 
the Treasury bonds which we use to bootstrap the Treasury zero curve, in 
order to get the yield spread hence calculate the risk-neutral default 
probabilities. To come around this problem, two corporate bonds are chosen. 
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One that matures as close prior to the Treasury and another one that matures 
as close subsequently as possible. From these two bonds a linear 
interpolation is made to find a new bond price that matches the given date of 
the Treasury. With the interpolated result there is a possibility to compare 
the yield of the Treasury with to corporate on and out of that get a 
measurement of the probability that’s sought after. 
6. Conclusion 
With the simplifying assumptions of the Hull and White model, we managed 
to calculate a number of static CDS spread for all 20 companies in our sample. 
However, comparing to the quoted CDS spread on the market, the model 
seems not performing well. Since the model is based on a theoretical structure 
it is incapable of adjusting to situations where factors deviate from the given 
assumptions, like investors attitude towards risk. This limits the accuracy of 
the results to only apply when conditions are suitable. 
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Appendix 1. Companies included in the study 
Company Name Industry Credit Rating 
Alcoa Aluminum BBB-/Baa3 
Bancorp Financial services BB+/Baa1 
Berkshire Hathaway Financial services AAA 
Burlington Industries Textile manufacturer A/Aa2 
Capital One  Financial services BBB/Baa1 
Cardinal Health Drug Wholesale BBB+/Baa3 
Caterpillar Financial  Financial services A/A2 
Citigroup Financial services C 
Coca-Cola  Beverage A/Aa2 
Eli Lilly and Company  Pharmaceuticals & Healthcare AA/A1 
Ford Credit Financial services CCC+ 
General Electric  Conglomerate AA+/Aa2 
Goldman Sachs Group Financial services A 
Kraft Foods Food Processing BBB+/Baa2 
Nucor  Steel & Iron A/A1 
Prudential Financial Financial services Baa2 
Union Pacific Transportation BBB/Baa2 
United Technologies  Conglomerates A/A2 
Wal-Mart Stores Retailing AA/Aa2 
Walt Disney  Media and Entertainment A 
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Appendix 2. Empirical findings on recovery rate 
Industry 
Average 
Recovery 
Rate % 
Public Utilities 70.5  
Chemical, petroleum, rubber and plastic products 62.7  
Machinery, instrments and related products 48.7  
Services - business and personal 46.2  
Food and kindred products 45.3  
Wholesale and retail trade 44.0  
Diversified namufacturing 42.3  
Casino, hotel and recreation 40.2  
Building material, metals and fabricated products 38.8  
Transportation and transportation equipment 38.4  
Communication, broadcasting, movie production 37.1  
Financial institutions 35.7  
Construction and real estate 35.3  
General merchandise stores 33.2  
Mining and petroleum drilling 33.0  
Textile and apparel products 31.7  
Wood, paper and leather products 29.8  
Lodging, hospitals and nursing facilities 26.5  
Total 41.0  
Altman & Kishore, Stern School NYU) 
This is the base paper on defaulted corporate bonds over the period 1971-1995. 
It came up with a wide range of differing recovery rates, by industry, as 
shown below. 
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Appendix 3. Graphs on theoretical and quoted CDS spread 
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